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Tactical Authenticity in the Production of Mad Narratives 
Simon Clarke and Colin Wright 
Abstract 
First-person accounts of madness and of encountering psychiatric services provide important 
sociocultural and psychological knowledge about the subjectivity of distress. The importance 
of such accounts is often based upon a claim of the authenticity of personal experience. 
However, authenticity is a highly heterogeneous concept: a popular current manifestation of 
the discourse of authenticity is in positive psychology, where it is often underpinned by 
humanist assumptions such as the rational autonomous self. The post-structuralist critique of 
humanism challenged such essentialist notions some time ago. The purpose of this article is to 
argue that this tension - between the value of narrative methods as a legitimate source of 
knowledge regarding the subjective experience of madness on the one hand, and the problems 
with an essentialist conception of the ‘authentic’ self on the other - can be addressed by the 
deployment of a reconceptualised form of authenticity based on Gayatri Spivak’s (1988) 
notion of ‘strategic essentialism’, especially when modified by Michel De Certeau’s (1984) 
distinction between ‘tactics’ and ‘strategies’. 
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Introduction 
R.D. Laing once wrote in the preface to The Divided Self that he wanted to “make madness, 
and the process of going mad, comprehensible” (Laing, 1960, p. 9). The problem, Laing 
argued, was that the categories used by biological psychiatry often bear little relationship to 
the actual experience of patients. Thus, by presenting madness in purely reductionist 
biological language, our understanding of what it is like to go mad becomes entirely 
mystified.  Although Laing did not have direct experience of madness himself when he wrote 
The Divided Self, the purpose of making madness comprehensible to those without first-
person experience has arguably been a key driver behind the growth in psychiatric ‘illness 
memoirs’, ‘autopathographies’ and ‘patient narratives’ of psychiatric experiences. Such 
accounts arguably provide an important source of knowledge about the experiences of 
madness ‘from the inside’ (Woods, 2012). There are several well-known narratives of this 
kind that have influenced the development of clinical theory and practice (Schreber, 1903; 
O’Brien, 1954; Greenberg, 1964; Barnes and Berke, 1990; Saks, 2007), and a plethora of 
lesser known works that are often used in medical training programmes (see Hornstein, 2008). 
Such accounts “have a vital role to play in our comprehending, mapping, and negotiating of 
madness” (Baker et al, 2010, p. 2). 
More recently, the emancipatory potential of first-person accounts of madness has 
been recognised in terms of offering “new ways of understanding mental distress and of 
working with people to identify new ways of living with or overcoming distress and providing 
services” (Faulkner, 2017, p 509). Grant et al.’s (2011) anthology, Our Encounters with 
Madness, which combines satire, observation and reflection, is one example of how service-
users/survivors utilise first-person experience in the service of challenging established 
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psychiatric practices and assumptions. This ‘experiential knowledge’, Faulkner (2017) argues, 
“has a significant contribution to make where some of the basic premises of professional 
knowledge are strongly contested” (p. 509).  
First-person accounts thus afford something important and unique that performs two 
distinct, but at times related, functions: to provide information and insight into an often 
ineffable and mysterious experience; and to challenge the very paradigm of bio-medical 
psychiatry itself from the perspectives of those who use, or have used, services. These two 
functions have not always co-existed easily but when their concerns overlap we would argue 
that this relates to a shared value regarding the authenticity of the first-person account, along 
with a recognition that such authenticity provides a possibility for valid knowledge claims. 
We would also argue that it is in the authenticity of such accounts that both the instructional 
and political possibilities cohere.  
Yet authenticity, precisely as a term with extensive cultural capital, is hardly neutral or 
homogenous, relating as it does to a whole range of practices, values and concepts in public 
life (Vannini and Williams, 2009). It is also a term that is laden with considerable conceptual 
baggage (Ferrara, 2009), to the point that some writers have dispensed with it completely, 
whilst also trying to establish the value of first-person accounts on an entirely separate basis 
(e.g., Lather, 2009; Grant et al, 2013). In our opinion, these latter attempts have not been very 
successful.    
In what follows therefore, we wish to outline a theory of authenticity that we believe 
may support the valorisation of first-person accounts of knowledge in mental health research 
without falling into several persistent traps. In doing so, we will be making the following 
claims: 
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1. Authenticity is a heterogeneous concept, but one which encompasses a series 
of values and practices that do cohere; 
2. Homogenising the concept of authenticity, conversely, opens the door to 
methodological difficulties and dubious practices and affiliations; 
3. Attempts to support first-person knowledge claims inevitably centre on some 
implicit variation of what we will call ‘the argument from authenticity’, even 
when they explicitly deny it; 
4. A modified concept of authenticity can be a viable basis to support first-person 
knowledge claims in a non-essentialist way – we will call this approach 
‘tactical authenticity’. 
 We will begin by briefly locating the concept of authenticity in terms of its linguistic, 
historical and conceptual background. To indicate some of the traps associated with it, we will 
then show how the recent positive psychology movement has re-appropriated the concept of 
authenticity in service of a neo-positivist and neo-liberal agenda. We will then explore how 
the poststructuralist critique of humanism has already complicated the idea of authenticity, but 
in sometimes contradictory ways that are arguably less useful to the ethical and political 
stakes of mad narratives. Nonetheless, in the final section we extract from these debates the 
notion of a tactical concept of authenticity which, we argue, may be politically useful in both 
asserting, and deploying in transformational ways, the value of first-person accounts of 
madness. 
Before proceeding however, we would like to clarify our chosen terminology (already 
a political question of course). We have deliberately opted to use the term ‘madness’ for the 
specific purposes this article. Although controversial, this term is preferable, in this context, to 
the narrow medical symptomology represented by other clinical definitions such as 
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‘psychosis’ or ‘schizophrenia’ (Baker et al, 2010). ‘Madness’ encompasses the broader social, 
psychological and cultural dimensions which are often the ones that matter most to the 
subjects experiencing mental distress (Burstow, 2015). With the emergence of sub-disciplines 
such as ‘Mad Studies’ and political movements focussed on the emancipation of service-users 
from stultifying institutional discourse (Starkman, 2015), the choice of ‘madness’ already 
reflects the strategic approach to discourse we will be arguing for. 
 We also recognise that various terms have been used to describe the recipients of 
mental health service treatment, including ‘patient’, ‘service-user’, ‘consumer’, ‘client’ and 
‘survivor’ (Noorani, 2013). Others argue that recovery from mental illness and its treatment is 
very often an achievement in itself (sadly, sometimes despite ‘services’ rather than because of 
them), and so prefer the term ‘survivor’ (Beresford, 2007). In recognition of this, we have 
therefore decided to use both terms interchangeably here to refer to people experiencing or 
who have experienced madness or distress within a mental health institutional context.  
 
Authenticity: Linguistic and Cultural Roots 
We will begin with a sketch of the extremely broad semantic reach of the term ‘authenticity’ 
before going on to give it some theoretical precision.  
Unsurprisingly, the origins of the word are complex and diverse. It first appeared in 
English from the mid-14th Century onwards when it had the now-defunct sense of 
‘authorised’, ‘authenticated’ or ‘recognised by legitimate authorities’ (for example, the 
acceptance of new doctrine by the Church authorities). It was borrowed from the Old French 
word autentique, which had the related meaning of ‘canonical’, as in, entitled to be included 
in the cannon of sacred knowledge. The French autentique derived in turn from the Medieval 
Latin term authenticus, which itself was directly derived from the Greek term authentikos, 
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meaning ‘original, genuine, principal’. The root of authentikos is authentes, which 
combines autos (‘self’) and hentes (‘doer, being’) to mean - in contrast to its later relation to 
external authorities such as the church - ‘acting on one’s own authority’. This Greek word 
hentes comes in turn from the Proto-Indo-European word sene, meaning to ‘accomplish’ or 
‘achieve’, implying an action that produces recognition. Even this brief etymology then 
highlights a tension between authors and authority at the heart of the notion of authenticity, as 
well as foregrounding agency and recognition over and above the accurate representation of 
‘reality’ that dominates our contemporary understanding of the term: for example, the Oxford 
English Dictionary currently defines authenticity as being “in accordance with fact, as being 
true in substance.” Indeed, some interpreters also cite the Greek word authenteo which means 
to have ‘full power over’ to the extent of ‘usurping another’ or even ‘committing a murder’ 
(Trilling, 1972).  
 Given these diverse etymological roots, it is no surprise that modern usage is equally 
diverse. ‘Authentic’ can mean ‘real’ in the sense of not a copy (e.g., an ‘authentic’ or verified 
Van Gogh painting, with a corresponding market value); or it can denote the subjective 
fidelity of an artistic representation (e.g., Virginia Woolf’s The Lighthouse is an ‘authentic’ 
depiction of manic depression); or it can be used to describe the integrity of a person or 
behaviour (e.g., Jeremy Corbyn is an ‘authentic politician’ in that he doesn’t just tell people 
what they want to hear etc.). In terms of personality descriptors, we generally describe 
someone as authentic in terms of their genuineness, forthrightness, honesty and congruence. 
One could still understand it through the ancient Greek rhetorical theory of ethos: authenticity 
is what gives truth-value to someone’s speech or discourse because of the personal integrity 
and relevant experience of the speaker. It is not just that the content of the speech is factually 
true, but that the one who speaks is especially, perhaps even uniquely, entitled to speak on this 
topic by dint of their personal experience. 
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Authenticity and Existentialism 
Whist the term and the meanings it conveys have undeniable social currency, authenticity is 
more than just a cultural value or useful social heuristic: it has also enjoyed status as a 
recurring concept in philosophical discourse. As a fully formulated intellectual understanding 
of the world, modern academic concepts of authenticity derived largely from the work of 
continental philosophy in the 1930s through to the1950s, particularly Martin Heidegger and 
Jean Paul Sartre (Kaufmann, 1975). Both explicitly used the term ‘authenticity’ in their 
works, although in very different ways (Medlock, 2012). Early Heidegger formulated his 
version of authenticity, in the second section of Division Two of Being and Time (1998), 
according to the neologism eigentlichkeit, which names the attitude in which one engages in 
projects as one’s own (eigen). Heidegger was playing on the ordinary German term 
‘eigentlich’, meaning ‘truly’, but which has the root ‘eigen’ meaning ‘own’ or ‘proper to’. 
Adding ‘keit’ to eigentlich turns it into a transitive project, an unfolding ‘ownedness’ which 
also implies ‘owning’ or ‘propering’. Therefore, for Heidegger, authenticity involves taking 
ownership of one’s life in terms of one’s relation to Being, in contrast to the majority of 
people who are content with a form of inauthentic ‘thrownness’ into the everydayness of ‘the-
they’. For Sartre (1948), relatedly, authenticity consists in avoiding the ‘bad faith’ that comes 
from denying the inescapable tensions between choice and circumstance. The authentic 
person here is the one who makes choices, and takes responsibility for these choices, despite 
the horror or disgust they may feel towards the ultimate meaninglessness of the universe 
(Kaufmann, 1975). 
Heidegger and Sartre’s work was subjected to sustained criticism on both ethical and 
philosophical grounds. Adorno (2003), in particular, characterised the terms used in 
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Heidegger’s ‘jargon of authenticity’ as a rootless and ahistorical form of obscurantism that 
“gives itself over either to the market, to balderdash, or the prevailing vulgarity” (2003, pg. 
xix) and takes the form of religious belief but without the content. According to Adorno such 
terms individualise subjectivity according to a spurious essentialism (i.e., in Heidegger’s 
notion of Dasein) that could ultimately be used to legitimise both the bureaucratic tyranny of 
Nazism and the exploitative language of advertising in late Capitalism: authenticity for 
Adorno (1973) would involve confronting the negative dialectics of non-identity. Regarding 
Sartre, Jacques Derrida (1972) pointed out that he never quite dispensed with the notion of a 
Cartesian self that can make choices, and analyse those choices, somehow outside of the 
constraints of societal context or language. Indeed, for Derrida Sartre’s project was “nothing 
other than the metaphysical unity of man and God, the relation of man to God, the project of 
becoming God as the project constituting human-reality”, so much so that “Atheism changes 
nothing in this fundamental structure” (Derrida, 1972, p. 116). Authenticity for Derrida would 
smack of onto-theology and metaphysics. 
 
Authenticity and Positive Psychology 
Both Adorno and Derrida’s influential critiques represented the vanguard of an intellectual 
movement that led to the decline of existentialism in academic circles and popular culture. 
However, at the same time that existentialism was beginning to decline in influence in 
Europe, some of its main theoretical tenets were to be revived, albeit in a very culturally 
idiosyncratic way, in American Humanist psychology. Carl Roger’s articulation of the 
‘actualising principle’ at the centre of human striving owed much to that precursor of 
existentialism, Søren Kierkegaard, whilst Abraham Maslow’s famous ‘hierarchy of needs’ 
and ‘peak experiences’ similarly borrowed from Friedrich Nietzsche (Medlock, 2012). Of 
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course, the profoundly disturbing, even deconstructive, nature of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche’s 
thought is noticeably absent from Rogers and Maslow; instead, the individual is conceived of 
in terms of ‘positive striving’ and the drive to ‘congruence’, rather than in terms of their 
relation to sin (Kierkegaard) or power (Nietzsche).  
 If American Humanism seemed to borrow from an existentialist language shorn of its 
more pessimistic and challenging elements, then this probably represented something of the 
culture of both the United States and the growing discipline of psychology. The spectre of the 
essentialist Cartesian self, present indirectly in Sartre’s thought, is very much in the 
foreground in empirical psychology. Indeed, the entire project of a scientific psychology is 
predicated on the notion that such a self can be objectively measured and analysed according 
to the principles of propositional attitudes and independent causal laws of human behaviour 
(Parker, 2007). Without such a commitment, the very notion of a scientific study of human 
persons begins to dissipate. 
 It is little surprise then that the concept of authenticity would experience something of 
a revival through a marriage between American Humanism and empirical psychology in the 
newer sub-discipline of positive psychology (Waterman, 2013). According to its proponents, 
positive psychology is “the scientific and applied approach to uncovering people’s strengths 
and promoting their positive functioning” (Snyder and Lopez, 2006, p. 3). Distancing 
themselves from what they perceived to be mainstream psychology’s preoccupation with the 
‘negative’ aspects of human pathology, positive psychology instead focusses upon the 
‘positive’ aspects of human nature conceived by Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000) as 
positive subjective experiences, positive individual traits, and civic virtues. These ‘civic 
virtues’ are tied to Classical character traits such as wisdom, courage, humanity, justice, 
temperance and transcendence, all formulated according to the basic assumptions of positive 
psychology: that there is a human “nature”; that action proceeds from character; that character 
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comes in two forms, both equally fundamental - bad character and good virtuous character 
(Seligman, 2002a, p. 125). As Seligman (2002b) summarises the positive psychology 
perspective on human functioning: “When well-being comes from engaging our strengths and 
virtues, our lives are imbued with authenticity” (p. 14). 
If the assumptions underlying positive psychology seem somewhat simplistic (can 
character traits ever be understood outside of particular socio-cultural contexts, before even 
evaluating whether they can be conceived of as ultimately good or bad?), then this is probably 
in part the psychologist’s tendency to formulate concepts that can be easily subjected to 
quantitative evaluation (Parker, 2007). A more recent trend in the growing conceptual 
amalgamation between humanist and positive psychology is the rise of empirical 
measurement of key humanist concepts (Joseph, 2005). On this basis, the concept of 
authenticity has been developed from Rogers’ (1961) notion of congruence and investigated 
as an ‘individual difference variable’ leading to formulations of the ‘authentic personality’ 
(Wood et al, 2008). In this ‘new’ approach to authenticity, authentic living can be understood 
as “being true to oneself in most situations and living in accordance with one’s values and 
beliefs” (p. 386), with psychopathology becoming the degree to which “the person 
experiences self-alienation between conscious awareness and actual experience (the true 
self)” (p. 386). Finally, “the extent to which one accepts the influence of other people” along 
with “the belief that one has to conform to the expectations of others” (p. 382) marks out the 
degree to which one is able to ‘resist external authority’ – the third component in Wood et al’s 
(2008) tripartite conception of authenticity. This ‘authentic personality’ has then been 
measured in a number of ways familiar to empirical psychology including questionnaires, 
laboratory experiments and mood reporting via digital technology (Lenton, Bruder et al, 2013; 
Lenton, Slabu et al, 2013; Davis et al, 2015). 
 11 
  The tendency in the empirical psychology literature has been to look at associations 
between authenticity and popular positive psychology concepts such as ‘wellness’, 
‘flourishing’ or ‘flow’ and this probably reflects the tacit assumption that authenticity can be 
used as a benchmark for other positive psychology concepts such as ‘wellbeing’ and ‘self-
actualisation’ (Joseph, 2005). It is entirely possible that white supremacists in the United 
States, for example, could experience congruence between their actual experience of hating 
black people and their values of ethnic purity, whilst also resisting the external authority of 
Liberal political consensus through hate rallies and armed militias, but we have yet to come 
across a positive psychology study that has looked at authenticity and flourishing amongst the 
alt-right. This example may be extreme perhaps, but it does illustrate the tendency amongst 
some psychologists to assume their concepts are ‘objective’ and thus apolitical (Parker, 2007), 
whilst simultaneously employing standards of measurement and theoretical constructs that are 
tied very closely to political practices that are far from neutral or benign (Rose, 1999). Whilst 
it is beyond the scope of this article to look more closely at the links between happiness 
studies, positive psychology and the political practices of the wellness industry, much has 
already been written on the subject (e.g., Wright, 2013; Wright, 2014; Davies, 2016; 
Cederström and Spicer, 2009). 
However, these issues aside, there are theoretical and methodological shortcomings of 
the theory and practice of authenticity research within the narrow disciplinary confines of 
psychology. For instance, people who are ‘inauthentic’ are, by definition, highly unlikely to 
be aware of their supposed inauthenticity and hence highly unlikely to reflect this quality in 
the type of measurements used by psychologists (e.g., questionnaires). The difficulty appears 
to reside in how the complexity of identity, and the varied manifestations of selfhood in 
everyday life, may alter considerably according to different contexts and the different roles 
people occupy in these contexts (Ferrara, 2009). This leads however to the paradox of an 
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inauthentic study of authenticity, one which ultimately relies on a binary notion of self that is 
built upon a true/false dichotomy often taken for granted by authenticity researchers. 
Psychologists have reprised the essentialist nature and meaning of a ‘core self’ (Parker, 2007), 
but a core self that is tied to the much narrower idea of living according to a pre-set criterion 
of ‘strengths’ and ‘virtues’.  
These complexities have led some psychological authenticity researchers to conclude 
that the best way of studying authenticity may be across a whole lifespan using 
autobiographical life-story narratives (Harter, 2005). Here, at least some form of 
developmental continuity in behaviour can be established beyond the immediate context of 
the psychological survey or experiment. As Harter (2005) elaborates: 
[N]arrative construction is a continuous process as we not only 
craft but also revise the story of our lives, creating blueprints 
that facilitate architectural development of the self. In so doing, 
one’s life story can also emerge as a true story (p. 391). 
 In other words, the complexity of narrative construction and reconstruction, along with 
its relationship with the ongoing process of revision, mean that the ‘truth’ of the story (i.e., its 
‘authenticity’) can emerge in the process of telling. Is the future for the study of authenticity 
therefore to be found in narrative approaches, and not in empirical psychology? In the 
following section, we explore this link between narrative research and authenticity more 
closely. 
 
Narratives and Authenticity 
In many ways, the place at which Harter arrives above probably represents more continuity 
with the concept’s phenomenological and existential origins, than with the somewhat 
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incongruent position represented by much empirical positive psychology (i.e., narrative as 
self-making or autopoiesis as opposed, ultimately, to market research moods). Indeed, most 
research from the Humanist psychology stable tends to be qualitative for these reasons 
(Joseph, 2005). Yet, narrative research has its own narrative of authenticity about its 
legitimacy. Frustrated by research that failed to recognise the invisible and unacknowledged, 
yet very real, presence of the researcher (Ellis and Bochner, 2000), alongside disillusionment 
with what was perceived to be the increasingly sequestered and elitist position of academic 
discourse, many qualitative researchers sought to recapture something of the vitality of ‘lived 
experience’ in the research enterprise (Bochner, 2001). The development of autoethnography, 
whereby the researcher’s own experience becomes the primary ‘data’ for ethnographic 
research, in some ways represented the culmination of these trends (Denzin and Lincoln, 
2000). “I become a detached spectator” write Ellis and Bochner (2006) when contrasting their 
autoethnographic approach with more traditional methods:  
I become only a head, cut off from my body and emotions.  
There’s no personal story to engage me. Knowledge and theory 
become disembodied words on the page and I lose connection. I 
want to linger in the world of experience, you know, feel it, taste 
it, sense it, live in it. (p. 481). 
This focus on lived experience prioritised both the stories of the researcher and 
researched, but also the first-person perspective as an important way of writing academic 
research (Ellis, 2004). The so-called ‘narrative turn’ in the social sciences was therefore 
predicated on what Grant et al. (2013) depicted as “a shift from a single, monolithic 
conception of what should constitute scholarly work in favour of a developing pluralism” (p. 
3). In other words, the argument deployed against the perceived hegemony of academia and 
for the restoration of the first-person perspective was one of authenticity. In these terms, and 
 14 
at first glance, narrative approaches would seem to provide an ideal basis for an empirical 
study of human life and subjectivity, both in terms of developing knowledge but also in terms 
of an ethical imperative to honour the experience of those being researched. Art Bochner 
(2001), a prominent autoethnographic researcher, phrased it in this way: 
Illness narratives have a major role to play in the ill person’s 
quest for authenticity, a journey he or she may never reach but 
cannot resist. When I read or hear an illness narrative, I take 
note of the first-person voice, the struggle with adversity, the 
heartbreaking feelings of stigma and marginalization, the 
resistance to the authority of canonical discourses, the 
therapeutic desire to face up to the challenges and to emerge 
with greater self-knowledge, the opposition to the repression of 
the body, the difficulty of finding the words to make bodily 
dysfunction meaningful, the desire for self-expression, and the 
urge to speak to and assist a community of fellow-sufferers. (p. 
147) 
Bochner’s (2001) arguments are persuasive, and are used as a foundation for narrative 
research. However, such ‘arguments from authenticity’ are not without issues. 
 
The Problems with Narrative 
In fact, many narrative approaches fall prey to a set of problems that also underlie the 
empirical positive psychology approaches – namely, the assumptions surrounding the self, 
particularly the true/false binary, or even the notion that there is such thing as a ‘true’ self to 
begin with, outside of the way in which the ‘self’ is performed in a particular social context. 
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For example, Atkinson (2009) has developed a scathing critique of narrative research which 
contends that “narratives are treated as proxies for the direct apprehension of subjective, 
personal experience” (S1.3) and are thus “treated as sources of authenticity, grounded in the 
biographical particularities of speaking subjects” (2.11). One of the issues Atkinson highlights 
is the notion of supposed narrative exemplarity, but which ultimately results in a reductionism 
that leads to “the equation of the social with the personal” (2.14). Atkinson (2012) refers to 
such approaches as ‘sentimental realism’ whereby “the narrating speaker is celebrated as an 
atomised subject” (2.14) with an emotional truth to convey. 
In a very real sense, Atkinson’s critique indicates the dangers of trying to establish 
arguments based on authenticity that appear to be self-evident but are in fact fraught with 
difficulties and challenges that are neither acknowledged nor worked through. Authenticity in 
the terms described by Bochner (2001) and others leads to the deployment of arguments for 
authenticity which result, paradoxically, in practices that are, even on their own terms, 
inauthentic. In other words, by taking the first-person perspective as a given, and by assuming 
an uncomplicated relationship between language and experience whilst displaying what 
Atkinson (2013) calls a “failure of nerve” in terms of textual experimentation, narrative 
researchers end up undermining their justification for the use of personal experience in 
research through the unreflexive nature of their recourse to it. 
It is no surprise therefore that some qualitative researchers dispense with the concept 
of authenticity entirely. For example, Patti Lather (2009) writes that “I see a desire for 
personal revelation that constructs the appearance of authenticity as having much to do with 
the abjection of theory and inscription of presence” (p. 20). This critique of ‘presence’, of 
course, derives from Derrida’s (1976) celebrated notion that ‘there is nothing outside the text’ 
(i.e., no ultimate ‘presence’ outside textual representations). According to Lather (2009) this 
“nostalgia of presence” (p.18) in qualitative research supposedly “makes present the truth and 
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reflects the meaning of an experience that has already happened” (Mazzei and Jackson, 2009, 
p. 4). In a similar vein, Lather’s colleague Lisa Mazzei (2009) argues that a pursuit of the 
‘impossibly full voice’ “constitutes itself in a resistance to classification and a desire for 
authenticity” (p. 46). 
 And yet, problematically, Lather (2009) christens her alternative to this problem of 
metaphysical ‘authenticity’ a ‘validity of tears’, defined as an “opaque personal confession 
outside formulas, personal writing that is scandalous, excessive and leaky but based in lack 
and ruin rather than plenitude” (p. 22). Unfortunately, this attempted deconstruction of the 
idea of authenticity (at least in humanist terms) still legitimises her research on the basis of its 
affective or emotional resonance (its ‘validity of tears’), presumably relative to some kind of 
centred subject. Lather’s (2009) and Mazzei’s (2009) arguments become paradoxical, 
appearing to be doing away with authenticity by appealing to an argument for authenticity, 
albeit one that works through the disruption of singular identities and the proliferation of 
multiple voices and, ultimately, through a valorisation of untheorized affect. Whilst they 
acknowledge the dangers of emotionalism, their proposed strategies, although very much 
grounded in postmodern and poststructuralist arguments for the disruption of the metaphysics 
of presence, appear to be based upon the very same arguments of authenticity that 
substantiated narrative research in the first place.  
These and similar arguments are also rehearsed in order to establish the validity of 
autoethnography. According to Grant et al. (2013), narrative research should favour “the 
poststructural narrating voice of the emergent ‘I’” over the “narrative voice of the 
predetermined I” (p. 8). The task of writing research is thus more to “show how subjectivity is 
produced rather than to display a privileged and secure, transcendent narrative identity 
position” (ibid p.8). In a similar vein to Mazzei and Lather, they favour privileging of the 
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distinctive voice, including the use of irony, humour, mockery, silence and textual disruption 
of the singular voice. 
However, like Mazzei and Lather, such an enterprise still leads Grant et al. (2013) to 
try to establish validity for narrative research against the criticisms of positivism. There is an 
important dilemma here: how can narrative research be legitimised, when the main argument 
for its validity has resided in an argument for authenticity? It appears to be something of a 
contradiction when Grant et al. (2013) repudiate the role of authenticity so fully in their 
chapter because of its humanist assumptions of presence, and then assert that:  
Arguably, academic-, discipline- and profession-based practice 
based on personal knowledge and experience is more credible, 
ethical, imbued with integrity, empathic and potentially 
effective. This marks the difference between implicational and 
propositional knowledge: between knowing, feeling, connecting 
and doing, from the heart, based on personal experience, rather 
than solely on the basis of rationally acquired information. (p. 
11). 
We concur with everything that Grant et al. (2013) argue in this passage and believe 
that they have very succinctly summarised why narratives are so important. Such arguments 
also provide a strong basis for narrative mental health research. However, they are still 
arguments for authenticity that surreptitiously employ the same categories used by earlier, 
humanist researchers.  
Of course, it is possible that both Grant et al (2013) and Lather’s (2009) arguments are 
based on an overly-simplistic reading of Derrida (1976), maintaining, as they do, some of the 
binaries of presence (e.g., feeling/intellect, implicational/propositional etc.) that Derrida was 
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at pains to deconstruct in his work. However, if we do abandon notions of authenticity on the 
basis that they re-inscribe humanist notions of presence, on what basis can we still emphasise 
the strategic importance of such narratives? 
 
Strategic Authenticity and Mad Narratives 
The psychiatric survivor and mental health researcher who wants to pursue narrative 
approaches to voicing their experience is caught in a peculiar double-bind. On the one hand, 
the values of such approaches may seem self-evident in terms of challenging stigma, whilst 
also providing the opportunity to educate professionals, lay people and students as to the 
actual conditions and experiences of people who use services (Russo, 2016). On the other 
hand, there is a risk of falling into unhelpful binary oppositions when invoking concepts such 
as ‘voice’ or ‘lived experience’ (Voronka, 2016) that risk creating a different set of problems. 
 The postcolonial theorist, Gayatri Spivak (1990), recognised a similar dilemma in the 
position she often found herself occupying as a ‘spokesperson’ for ‘subaltern’ Indian women, 
but it was a dilemma she attempted to turn to advantage: 
But it is not possible, within discourse, to escape essentializing 
somewhere. The moment of essentialism or essentialization is 
irreducible. In deconstructive critical practice, you have to be 
aware that you are going to essentialize anyway. So then 
strategically, you can look at essentialisms, not as descriptions 
of the way things are, but as something that one must adopt to 
produce a critique of anything. (p. 51) 
In other words, the essentialist categories of ‘Indian’ and ‘woman’ may indeed be 
problematic, but they do provide the (‘Indian’, ‘woman’) speaker with a certain degree of 
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legitimisation in the mainstream discourse, a place from which to speak and from which some 
form of resistance and challenge can be mobilised. As Spivak (1988) elaborates, “it is within 
the framework of a strategic interest in the self-alienating displacing move of and by a 
consciousness of collectivity, then, that self-determination and an unalienated self-
consciousness can be broached” (p. 14). Could the same approach work for mad narratives, 
that is, a legitimisation of the survivor’s ‘voice’ based upon this ‘strategic’ version of 
authenticity? 
Whilst this approach may be superficially attractive, there are at least three problems 
when applied to madness narratives. Firstly, madness can be described as a ‘limit experience’ 
which, according to Foucault (2001), has the “function of wrenching the subject from itself, of 
seeing to it that the subject is no longer itself, or that it is brought to its annihilation or its 
dissolution” (p. 241). Madness is therefore an inherently deconstructive experience; when 
speaking or writing about such experiences there can be “a disjunction between the content to 
be narrated and the possibilities inhering in conventional narrative forms” (Stone, 2004, p. 
18). Secondly, madness is not a homogenous experience; some experiences may be 
constructed differently in different contexts (e.g., religious voice hearers in church and voice-
hearing psychiatric patients in hospital) and so-called ‘mad identity’ incorporates a vast range 
of conditions, experiences and even treatments (Miller, 2017). It is thus difficult to 
essentialise an experience that is as heterogeneous as extreme psychological distress when the 
conditions for some experiences (e.g., eating disorders) are bound to differ significantly from 
others (e.g., psychosis). As Miller (2017) observes, “the experience of psychiatric oppression 
in its various forms is presumably an important commonality, but there seems no reason to 
presume any further unanimity” (p. 17).  
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, it is questionable whether intervening through 
essentialising experiential or identity categories actually works. Sometimes, the place you are 
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given to speak from is simultaneously a major constraint on what you can say, or be heard as 
saying. Indeed, Spivak eventually rejected the concept of strategic essentialism precisely 
because “my notion just simply became the union ticket for essentialism” (Danius et al, 1993, 
p. 35): in other words, it led to the very essentialist tendencies she was seeking to avoid in the 
first place. In the field of mental health, where differences between experiences are even less 
likely to be anchored to singular identity categories, “using experience and identity as a 
commodity to gain entry into systems of power”, as Voronka (2016) observed when laying 
claim to authenticity in experience, can result in “entrenching and naturalizing difference” (p. 
199).  
When discussing her eventual rejection of the concept of strategic essentialism, Spivak 
added a further important qualifying observation: “As to what is meant by strategy, no one 
wondered about that” (Danius et al, 1993, p. 35). This raises an important question regarding 
the limitations of ‘strategy’ itself that may provide some clue as to why her project was 
unsuccessful. One possible solution, we would argue, might be found in the work of Michel 
De Certeau and specifically in his distinction between ‘strategies’ and ‘tactics’. Drawn from 
the language of the military, De Certeau (1984) calls strategy “the calculation (or 
manipulation) of power relationships that becomes possible as soon as a subject with will and 
power (a business, an army, a city, a scientific institution) can be isolated.” (p. 35-6). Once 
isolated in terms of the demarcation of place, strategy results in important effects including: 
the ability to establish time according to an autonomous place; the mastery of place through 
sight and the ability to read this space (in terms of a ‘panoptic practice’); and, finally, the 
legitimacy to define the power of knowledge via the transformation of the uncertainties of 
time and history into definable spaces and indeed narratives. Although Spivak attempted to 
use ‘strategy’ in the sense of a political pragmatics that compromises with the status quo in 
order, nonetheless, to pursue change (see chapter 3 in Spivak, 1990), de Certeau brings out the 
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term’s connections to top-down rational control, often through the spatialised administration 
of identities: the overlap between these two meanings of ‘strategy’ arguably accounts for the 
complexity of so-called identity politics, especially in Spivak’s US context (Wright, 2002). 
In contrast to strategies in either of these senses, De Certeau (1984) defined ‘tactics’ as 
“a calculated action determined by the absence of a proper locus” (p. 37), that is, of a space of 
its own, which also occurs in a different temporality, one that seizes the opportune moment 
(what the ancient Greeks called Kairos) rather than conforming to the metronymic regularity 
of rationalised time (Chronos). These are the methods of the other (i.e., the ‘weak’, the 
marginalised, those with very little power), the only recourse of those without “the options of 
planning general strategy and viewing the adversary as a whole within a distinct, visible and 
objectifiable space” (p. 37). Due to the colonisation of space by strategy, tactics make use of 
“a mobility that must accept the chance offerings of the moment” in terms of “making use of 
the cracks that particular conjunctions open in the surveillance of the proprietary powers” (p. 
37). Tactics are thus “procedures that gain validity in relation to the pertinence they lend to 
time” (p. 38) by occupying the strategy from inside, but then disrupting that space through “a 
clever utiliziation of time, of the opportunities it presents and also the play that it introduces 
into the foundations of power” (p. 38-9). In this way, “strategy is transformed into tactics” (p. 
37). 
Tactics are thus adaptations to environments that may well be shaped by strategy, but 
are in opposition to it. For example, town planners might determine the streets of a city with 
expectations of how people will use them, but those who know the environment, the ‘users’, 
will spontaneously adapt the routes they take to suit their experience (e.g., taxi drivers using 
shortcuts, or so-called ‘desire lines’ that traverse planned pathways). One could perhaps also 
define the relationship of psychiatry and the service-user/survivor movement in a similar way: 
psychiatry as a discipline maintains a presence through strategies of place (hospitals, clinics, 
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university faculties and training institutions); sight (technologies linked to measurement - 
scans, tests, questionnaires etc.); and, finally, bodies of knowledge (classification systems 
such as the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual). However, service-user movements have been 
able to gain a foothold within these institutions through neo-liberal policies of patient 
engagement, which give them some kind of space in which to speak, so that service-user 
representation in national health services in fact became mandatory in the UK (Rose, 2015). 
In a telling example (Rose et al, 2003), service-user researchers have been able to utilise the 
methods of positivist psychiatry (e.g., the systematic review), and the injunction for ‘gold 
standard’ evidence-based practice, to show that when participants were interviewed by 
service-user researchers, satisfaction with electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) was significantly 
lower than previously estimated when the research was conducted by professional researchers 
or clinicians (Rose, 2008). Thus, the tactics employed by ‘the weak’, based upon 
contextualised knowledge which was then employed using the language of strategy (the 
rhetoric of ‘evidence-based practice’), were used to subvert the knowledge claims of the 
dominant (by showing the lack of rigour in previous studies that did not consider the 
contextual effects of the researcher), resulting in changes to policy in terms of how ECT was 
administered. As Rose (2008) later elaborated, “We intervene on the terrain drawn by 
psychiatry and try to re-shape its priorities in a user-focused direction” (p. 642). Tactical 
interventions differ from strategies in these fields, by displacing the identity-categories that 
are part of the problem. 
Mad narratives may offer a similar tactic in terms of intervening into the discourses of 
psychiatry via the discourse of authenticity. As Charles Taylor (1991) recognised, “the moral 
force of the ideal of authenticity” (p. 17) is still “one of the constitutive ideals of modern 
culture” (p. 18). Similarly, the liberal representational stance of Western culture (i.e., ‘I 
respect your experience and I’m listening to what you have to say about it’) provides 
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opportunities for mad narratives to occupy a space within psychiatric research and practice, 
but in order to tactically disrupt it. This may be through Grant et al.’s (2013) method of 
privileging of the distinctive voice, including irony, humour, mockery, silence etc., or it may 
be in terms of Frank’s (2005) ‘dialogic’ approach to narrative research based on the 
recognition of multiplicity of voice; but all such approaches would have to take into account 
Spivak’s point, a propos of Derrida, that the metaphor of voice itself carries the danger of 
essentialising ‘representationalism’ (Landry and Maclean, 1992).  
Better still then, mad narratives might lay claim (or, indeed, re-claim) the original 
meaning of the term ‘authenticity’ in terms of the importance of gaining recognition, and 
establishing authority for one’s experience precisely there where the ‘owness’ of experience is 
put into radical question. This reclamation might take place through the medium of what De 
Certeau (1984) called the ‘poetics of everyday life’, including time spent in writing, talking, 
cooking and other activities that live in the interstices of strategic spaces such as the 
psychiatric ward. In tactical madness narratives, such poetics might take the form of using the 
‘official’ discourse of psychiatry (e.g. in the form of clinical notes) presented alongside thick 
descriptions of the experiences of survivors and carers (e.g. Clarke, In press), in order to show 
how the everyday experience of a psychiatric patient is transformed into a discourse that 
serves strategic purposes. Such narratives might juxtapose fragmented personal accounts with 
theoretical analysis and reflections on method in a ‘layered account’ (Rambo, 2013) that 
attempts not to impose the ‘panoptical’ view of any particular ‘voice’. It may also take the 
form of biographies with multiple discontinues timelines (Clarke, In press) whereby the 
disorientation of the narrative inducts the reader into the disorienting experience of madness. 
Such methods do not claim to offer what the late poet Geoffrey Hill called “a naive trust in 
the unchallengeable authority of the authentic self”, but deploy, instead, an authenticity in 
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which “the instrument of expression and the instrument of self-knowledge and self-correction 
is the same” (Phillips, 2000). 
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